96 lines
5.2 KiB
PHP
96 lines
5.2 KiB
PHP
<?php
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$lan = array(
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"BackEditTemp" => "Voltar para a edição do Modelo",
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"TempSample" => '
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I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me,
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Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself,
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and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that
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in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term
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many, participate--things which participate in likeness become in that
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degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become
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in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they
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participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and
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be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the
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wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or
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the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a
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wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the
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things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor,
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again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at
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the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing.
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But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute
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many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be
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surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite
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qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and
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also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have
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a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower
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half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other
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hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here
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assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both
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instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things
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as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he
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shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the
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many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism.
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If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple
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notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and
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then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I
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should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be
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treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I
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should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which
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are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have
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shown to exist in visible objects.
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While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno
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were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but
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still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and
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smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides
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expressed their feelings in the following words:--
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Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell
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me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the
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things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of
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likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many,
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and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?
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I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.
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Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just
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and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?
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Yes, he said, I should.
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And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human
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creatures, or of fire and water?
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I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or
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not.
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And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the
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mention may provoke a smile?--I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or
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anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of
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these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into
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contact, or not?
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Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they
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appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming
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any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think
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that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up
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this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a
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bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of
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which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.
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Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the
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time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer
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grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at
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your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I
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should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which
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all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that
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similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity;
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and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that
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just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake
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of justice and beauty?
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Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.',
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);
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?>
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